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Abstract
Secure communications are playing increasing roles in society, particularly in finance, jour-
nalism, and military projects. Current methods of securing e-mail and similar messaging
methods rely on encryption of the message body, but the header with addressing information
remains plaintext. This allows third party eavesdroppers to collect and analyse the header
metadata and construct a network model of the participants in conversations (who, where,
when, subject). In this article, we describe a method of communication where the header is
also encrypted, hindering the assembly of the communication network models, which is verified
with a working prototype application. This provides a useful tool to journalists and proponents
of free speech in oppressed countries, protecting both the messages and their sources.
∗Corresponding author: phil.m.bentley@gmail.com
1
ar
X
iv
:1
41
1.
64
09
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
4 N
ov
 20
14
1 Introduction
Digital communications are widespread, and the norm for both business and personal interac-
tion in the modern world. The most widely-used email and messaging systems pass messages
entirely or partially in plaintext, allowing eavesdroppers at some stage the opportunity to
harvest the message content to their own ends. Common uses are the collection of contact
details for spam lists, analysing message content for targeted advertisements, and occasionally
financial fraud or government surveillance. More recently, the scope of government surveillance
in some oppressed political regimes has become the subject of concern for those supporting
democracy, free speech, and holding leaders accountable via journalism.
To: Bob
From: Alice
Subject: Police corruption
Dear Bob,
Here are some scary 
photos.
From Alice.
Alice is sending Bob 
evidence of police 
corruption...
Figure 1: Illustration of email without encryption. An adversary can
intercept the message and read it.
One solution to this problem is to encrypt the communications using end-to-end public-key
encryption, illustrated in figure 2.
The sender encrypts the message on their device, and only a recipient with the corre-
sponding private key is able to decrypt the message on their own device. The most famous
example is the RSA method [1], which is freely implemented in GPG [2]. Using encrypted
mail, the message content and any attachments are protected with strong algorithms to pre-
vent third parties from reading the content of the message easily. However, this still leaves
the “metadata”, which is the message header. This contains information about the sender,
the recipient, the time of the correpsondence, the given subject of the message, and some of
the routing that the message took. Third parties who intercept this metadata are able to
reconstruct the spheres of communication in the social network of an individual: who they
talk to, when and how frequently, and about what, even if the details of the messages are
protected. The metadata can be gathered at each and every step of the chain of servers that
transmit the messages across the internet. This means that for journalists, for example, who
wish to keep the identity of their sources confidential, or for government agents who wish to
be discreet about their correspondence, by using email they risk exposing themselves and their
message recipients to unwanted attention from third parties.
To protect the users identities and the rest of the communication network, it would be
necessary to encrypt the message header with strong encryption. In this way, it is more
difficult to establish who is talking to whom, and the source and recipient of the message can
be protected. The primary problem to solve is the passing of a message when the identity of
the recipient is unknown — where do you send it? The secondary problem is to make sure
the system is sufficiently fast for users. In this article, we describe a prototype system along
these lines, and the limitations of the current method, which may be improved considerably
in future work.
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To: Bob
From: Alice
Subject: More police 
corruption
[encrypted]
Alice is sending Bob 
something about of 
police corruption. 
But I cannot read it...
Figure 2: Illustration of email with currently available encryption. An
adversary can intercept the message but can only read the header, not
the content.
2 Description of Method
Our method, which we call “warp2” uses GnuPG to encrypt the message and attachments
like a regular encrypted email. The plaintext of the message header contains to, from, date,
subject fields like a regular email message. In addition to the usual header data, warp2 headers
also contain unique SHA2 identifiers for separate files making up the message body and an
attachment. The arrangement of files is illustrated in figure 3
Traditional messaging systems have separate inboxes for each user. If that were the case
for warp2, monitoring the access to an inbox could associate a user with that address, even
though the message and headers are encrypted. The solution is to have one public inbox for
all users on the server, containing all current message headers.
Our prototype uses GPG to encrypt both the message contents and the headers. Each
encrypted header file is around 1 kb in size. All users synchronise a copy of the entire header
inbox on their device. The “inbox” is a very simple database of header files, in our case stored
with filenames that are SHA2 hashes of the encrypted header file. In the prototype, a simple
MYSQL and PHP implementation was used to demonstrate the server methodology. The
encrypted message body and attachment files are stored in separate fields in the database,
and these are not downloaded in full. That way, the amount of traffic is minimised to just the
message headers.
2.1 Sending a Message
The device of the sender creates two or three files: the header, the message body, and an
attachment if necessary. The user encrypts the message body and attachment, and calculates
a SHA2 hash of the encrypted body and attachment files. These are put into the message
header file. A SHA2 hash of the message header plaintext is created to allow proof of receipt
(see section 3.1 later). The header is then encrypted. All three files are uploaded to the remote
inbox database, along with hash of the plaintext of the header.
2.2 Receiving a Message
The user first synchronises the inbox by downloading all new encrypted message headers from
the common inbox over an encrypted connection. Next, they filter the message headers to
identify which messages are intended for them. Warp2 tries to decrypt every header, and
flags any headers that fail decryption to be ignored in future. On the other hand, successful
decryption reveals the plaintext header, containing the identifiers of the message body and
attachment. The recipient then downloads the message body and attachment, and decrypts
them. Finally, the recipient computes the SHA2 hash of the plaintext header, and notifies
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Message
[encrypted]
Attachment
[encrypted]
Header
[encrypted]
To: Bob
From: Alice
Subject: More 
police corruption
Message hash
Attachment hash
Figure 3: Arrangement of files for a warp2 message.
the server of this plaintext. The server can then remove the message files associated with this
plaintext hash, or flag them as sent. The message sending process has now completed.
An adversary may be able to establish that one or more individuals are using a warp2
server, but they cannot easily identify the participants of a particular conversation just by
examining the messages alone, as shown in figure 4.
If the adversary polls the server to download the messages, they are free to do so, but they
do not obtain anything more than a large number of separate encrypted files, unless the have
other means of breaking the encryption.
3 Discussion
3.1 Speed Issues
The warp2 headers in the prototype using GPG are 1 kb in size. Assuming 1000 users on
the server, sending around 10 messages per day, the client software needs to decrypt less than
∼10 MB of header data per day, and the daily server bandwidth would be less than ∼10 GB
assuming the users check their inbox once per day.
Reducing the number of stored messages to the minimum necessary also helps to keep the
server and network requirements down. One way is to notify the database to purge messages
once they have been read by the recipient. This would also expose the system to vandals who
could delete any message they wanted, unless proof of readership is obtained. The message
database contains a hash of the header plaintext (not the plaintext itself). The idea is that
when the recipient calculates their computed hash of the header plaintext, they send it to
the database which deletes the row of a matching message, since the message transmission is
complete1.
3.2 Obvious Potential Attacks
The method is only as reliable as the weak points in the chain, and warp2 is exposed to the
same risks as the encryption technology, in the case of the prototype this is GPG.
Instead of tracking the headers, it is possible for a third party to track the private keys
that are needed to decrypt the message as a form of metadata, and construct a social network
model around private key IDs rather than email addresses. To defend against this, a double
key exchange can be envisaged. The first key exchange is made by external means, e.g. email,
face to face meeting, just like regular encrypted email. The second key exchange happens
within warp2, where the participants send their new keys to each other in a single message,
and delete their old key pairs. This creates two key pairs that are anonymous to a third party,
and independent of the initial point of contact, unless the warp2 messages making the key
1This feature is partially implemented in the prototype application, the server side is missing.
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Alice and Bob are 
using warp2...
Figure 4: An adversary may be able to identify users of a warp2 server
by intercepting web traffic, but not glean information about the conver-
sation.
Warp2 is just a public 
server full of 
encrypted files...
Header
[encrypted]
Header
[encrypted]
Header
[encrypted]
Message
[encrypted]
Message
[encrypted]
Message
[encrypted]
Figure 5: Scanning of the server reveals an open server full of encrypted
files.
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exchange are compromised by brute force or by duplication of keys. Re-exchanging keys this
way can be done as frequently as required, even per message for the super-cautious. Analysis
of the server traffic then may only allow identification of a fairly large group of IP addresses
who are using the server.
An attacker may be able to identify users from analysing the majority of the network traffic
to the server, and simultaneously polling the server at regular intervals whilst monitoring target
users. By linking the timing of new messages appearing with increased encrypted traffic of the
target user, it may be possible to statistically associate an IP address with an identity for that
message, and hence get the current key-ID. Similarly, if a message is downloaded and marked
as “received” using the plaintext tagging described earlier, the message disappears from the
system, and this could be statistically associated with possible recipients. This attack is
possible even if new keys are regularly exchanged. To mitigate these central points of attack,
a full warp2 deployment ideally would have a distributed inbox database, and distributed
storage with a suitable redundancy of messages and attachments to keep the memory footprint
manageable. This was not possible during the timeframe of the project, but potentially a
desirable feature for future use.
3.3 Vandalism
The prototype server accepts uploads from anybody, at the time of writing. A malicious party
who wishes to bring the server down could simply flood the server with messages to non-
existent users, which nonetheless appear valid to the simplistic server code. The inbox would
grow indefinitely under this scenario. In future production-ready deployments, a method of
avoiding vandalism is required.
3.4 Commercial Aspects
At present, the strength of the method is in the fact that large numbers of people could use a
warp2 server without identifying themselves. Requiring login credentials weakens the method,
because it creates unique identifiers before access to the inbox is allowed. This also affects the
commercialisation of the method, since paying customers would not want to be identified.
Instead of a closed system with login credential handling, warp2 is envisaged more along
the lines of a TOR network. Community-minded people would run warp2 servers that are
open to the public. These would be somewhat self regulating, since an over-burdened server
with slow access and large numbers of messages would encourage migration of users to servers
with lower loads.
Of course, a military deployment or commerical deployment within individual companies
could run their own warp2 server very quickly, and restrict access by using ssh keys to limit
logins to authorised client software only. In this scenario, it is perhaps not such an issue to
identify yourself as an employee by accessing the company warp2 server, just as a regular email
system. This is the foreseen deployment for journalists and governments.
3.5 About the Prototype Application
The prototype is written in C++ and Qt (Qt used under the LGPL). The source code for the
prototype is published on github [3] under the FreeBSD license.
The current status for platform support is as follows: the client code was developed on
linux (fedora 20), and OS-X (mountain lion); the server code is extremely simple, running
under apache and php5, and has been developed on OpenBSD and FreeBSD.
4 Conclusions
We have described and demonstrated a simple method of sending messages with encrypted ad-
dressing and message headers, protecting communications against interception and hindering
the construction of network models of participants. Weaknesses in the prototype implemen-
tation have been identified, and some mitigation strategies have been proposed for future
work.
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